# Secure Software Design

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# Outline

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# About me

- Mario Alviano
  - First and second degrees in Computer Science
  - PhD in Computer Science — Logic programming for AI
  - For details: http://www.alviano.net/
- Consultation hour
  - Tuesday 16:00 – 17:00
  - Check my website for changes
  - You may write me an e-mail to check if I will be in my office

# Course web page

```
https://www.mat.unical.it/ComputerScience/
SecureSoftwareDesign
```

### Hint

- You can receive update messages via email
    1. Register yourself on the wiki
       (unless you already did)
    2. Subscribe on the page

# Schedule

## When?

- Wednesday     10:30 – 13:30
- Thursday     08:30 – 10:30

## What?

Lectures and exercises, including PC exercises

## Where?

MT15

Check the web page for possible changes!

# Exams and attendance

## Exams

- Written, including PC exercises
- Dates to be fixed
- Homeworks presented in the class matter!
  (Up to around 3 bonus points on the first exam after the course)

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## Attendance

- Attendance of the lectures is mandatory
- To access the exam you have to attend at least 70% of the course

# Teaching material

## Slides and material on the web page

`https://www.mat.unical.it/ComputerScience/SecureSoftwareDesign`

## Suggested books

1. Allen Harper et al.
   *Gray Hat Hacking: The Ethical Hacker's Handbook*
2. The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java
3. Richard E. Smith
   *Elementary Information Security*
4. Chuck Easttom
   *System Forensics, Investigation & Response*

# Outline

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# Any problem here?

# Any problem here?



Difficult to shield

# Any problem here?



Difficult to shield

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Easy to guess

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Three categories:

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   - Established, widely accepted guidelines
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Three categories:

1. Rule-based decisions
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   - Outdo others
   - Example: hunter's dilemma
3. Requirements-based decisions
   - Systematic analysis of the security situation
   - Example: Risk Management Framework

# Risk Management Framework (1)

1. Categorize the information system
2. Select security controls
3. Implement security controls
4. Assess security controls
5. Authorize the information system
6. Monitor security

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### Continuous Improvement

The process never ends at the final step.

## Security Category

High-level estimate of the impact of failures

# Risk Management Framework

## Security Category

High-level estimate of the impact of failures

The CIA properties:

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

# Risk Management Framework (2)

## Security Category

High-level estimate of the impact of failures

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Potential impact for each property:

- Not applicable (NA; only for confidentiality)
- Low impact
- Moderate impact
- High impact

### Security Category

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SC *name* = {(confidentiality, *impact*), (integrity, *impact*),
(availability, *impact*)}

# Security boundaries

- The essence of any protection
- Establish a container for our assets
- Protect assets by denying access to threat agents
- Degree of protection in terms of strength of the boundary

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## Least Priviledge

- Limit the number of people allowed inside the security boundary
- If possible, restrict what each person may do to the asset

- Decompose the system into separate security domains
- Each domain has its own security boundaries
- Security domains may have a hierarchical structure

# Security architecture

- Decompose the system into separate security domains
- Each domain has its own security boundaries
- Security domains may have a hierarchical structure

## Defence in Depth (or layered defence)

Separate security domains shall provide separate layers of protection

- Who threatens our assets?
- Individuals are not important
- We are interested in identifying categories of people
- Those are our threat agents

# Potential attacks

What attacks arise when CIA properties fail?

- Disclosure
- Subversion
    - Forgery
    - Masquerade
- Denial of service (DOS)

# Ethical issues

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Responsible disclosure

- The finder reports the vulnerability to the vendor
- The vendor acknowledge the report within 7 days
- The vendor provides weekly updates to the finder
- The vendor and the finder should jointly decide how to announce the vulnerability
- If no agreement, the finder will provide a general announcement 30 days after the vendor was informed
- Announcements should **not** include details that allow an attacker to exploit the vulnerability

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- The CPU executes machine instructions
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A buffer overflow may replace the return address

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## Why this attack was possible

- Separation of data and instructions was not checked
- `finger` ran with root privilege

# Security alerts

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

- An official clearinghouse for reporting vulnerabilities
- Published CERT Advisories for many years
- CERT Advisory numbers are used to refer well-known vulnerabilities
- Today, we also use CVE numbers, from the Common Vulnerability Enumeration database

# Overview of the course

- Most frequent weaknesses in coding
- Noncompliant and compliant code examples
- Exploit exercises
- Assembly and low level attacks

END OF THE LECTURE